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ABSTRACT
We address the issue of asserting the accuracy of Internet co-
ordinates advertised by nodes of Internet coordinate systems
during distance estimations. Indeed, some nodes may even
lie deliberately about their coordinates to mount various at-
tacks against applications and overlays.
Our proposed method consists in two steps: 1) establish
the correctness of a node’s claimed coordinate by using the
Surveyor infrastructure and malicious embedding neighbor
detection proposed in our previous work on securing the co-
ordinates embedding phase; and 2) issue a time limited va-
lidity certificate for each verified coordinate.
Validity periods are computed based on an analysis of co-
ordinate inter-shift times observed by Surveyors. By doing
this, each surveyor can estimate the time until the next shift
and thus, can limit the validity of the certificate it issues to
regular nodes for their calculated coordinates. Our method
is illustrated on a trace collected from a Vivaldi system de-
ployed on PlanetLab, where inter-shift times are shown to
follow long-tail distribution (lognormal distribution in most
cases, or Weibull distribution otherwise).
We validate the effectiveness of our method by measuring
the impact of a variety of attacks on distance estimates.
1. INTRODUCTION
Internet coordinate systems (e.g. [1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]) have
been proposed to allow for distance (Round-Trip Time, shortly
RTT) estimation between nodes, in order to reduce the mea-
surement overhead of many applications and overlay net-
works. Indeed, by embedding the Internet delay space into
a metric space – an operation that only requires each node
in the system to measure delays to a small set of other nodes
(its neighbors), nodes are attributed coordinates that can then
be used to estimate the RTT between any two nodes, without
further measurements, simply by applying the distance func-
tion associated with the chosen metric space to the nodes’
coordinates.
The security of the embedding phase, or in other words the
∗L. Mathy was also partly supported by the University of Lie`ge,
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coordinate computation phase, of Internet coordinate sys-
tems has received some attention in the form of either sim-
ple mechanisms built into embedding protocols [3, 4] or a
more general, embedding protocol-independent cheat detec-
tion mechanism based on a Surveyor infrastructure [8]. All
of these mechanisms use distance measurements between
two nodes to, one way or an another, assess the plausibility
of the corresponding distance estimation based on the nodes’
current coordinates. In cases where the discrepancy between
the measured and estimated distances is deemed too impor-
tant, the node carrying out the test removes its correspon-
dent node from its set of neighbors. By doing this, it avoids
adjusting its coordinate in response to potentially malicious
information.
However, ultimately, Internet coordinate systems are used
to estimate distances between nodes, based on their coor-
dinates only, even and all the more so if these nodes have
never exchanged a distance measurement probe. Whatever
mechanism is used to obtain a node’s coordinate (e.g. direct
exchange, DNS-like repository, etc.), each node must some-
how report its own coordinate computed during the embed-
ding phase of the system. This is because, for scalability rea-
sons, nodes compute their own coordinates in a distributed
way. This, of course, provides a malicious node with an
opportunity to strike: in order to achieve some application-
dependent goal or advantage (e.g. free-riding, denial-of-
service, isolation, ubiquity gift, etc), a node can repeatedly
lie about its coordinate. Simply lying about its coordinate
could seriously disrupt the operations of Internet applica-
tions relying on coordinate-based systems for distance esti-
mation. Several studies have quantified the impact of cheat-
ing on topology-aware Internet applications, and have shown
that simple attack strategies can prove to be very effective [9,
10, 11]. This paper addresses the question of guaranteeing
the veracity of the coordinates advertised by nodes.
To do so, we propose to leverage the Surveyor infras-
tructure and embedding cheat detection test proposed in [8].
More precisely, we propose that several Surveyors measure
their distance to a node in order to verify the correctness of
its claimed coordinate (using the cheat detection test from [8]).
If all Surveyors agree that this coordinate is the node’s true
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coordinate, a time limited validity certificate, including the
certified coordinate, is issued to the node.
A certificate validity time period is necessary because, due
to dynamic network conditions, nodes’ coordinates vary in
time. Upon a coordinate change, an honest node would stop
using its current certificate and seek a certification of its new
coordinate. On the other hand, a malicious node could keep
using a certificate related to a previous position, hence a
careful balance between scalability and certificate validity
is desirable. To achieve this, one of our contributions is to
study the coordinate inter-shift time (i.e. the time between
coordinate changes at a node) as observed for a Vivaldi sys-
tem running on PlanetLab. We found that the coordinate
inter-shift times at most nodes follow a lognormal distribu-
tion, with the rare cases when this distribution is inappropri-
ate being accounted for by a Weibull distribution (note these
are both long-tail distributions).
The remainder of the paper is as follows: in section 2,
we study and characterize the coordinate inter-shift times
and show that these times observed at Surveyors can ade-
quately and statistically model inter-shift times at closeby
nodes. Section 3 describes the certification procedure in
detail, while performance evaluation of our proposal in the
context of various attacks is presented in section 4; section 5
concludes the paper.
2. COORDINATES EVOLUTION MODEL
Our goal is to characterize and ascertain forward validity
of nodes’ coordinates during the distance estimation phase.
We therefore concentrate on tracking the evolution in time of
coordinates along the different axis of the coordinate space
by observing their evolution in a clean system (without any
malicious activity).
2.1 Experimental Set-up
The measurement used in this study comes from traces ob-
tained by running the Vivaldi System on 600 planetLab ma-
chines through a period of 18-days. These traces were then
acquired in a clean environment with no malicious node. We
also used live-PlanetLab experiments, as a Vivaldi service
deployed over a three-weeks period, to demonstrate the va-
lidity and effectiveness of our proposal to deal with various
attacks.
In our initial trace, we kept the coordinates of 450 nodes,
as several nodes, that have been down for more than one
week or experienced connectivity troubles, have been fil-
tered out. Some of them even do not respond to different
RPC requests sent by the Vivaldi service.
In this trace, Vivaldi is using a 3-dimensional Euclidean
space for the embedding. Each 10 minutes, corresponding
to an embedding step, nodes are adjusting their coordinates
based on a one-to-one interaction with another node, called
a peer node. Finally, Vivaldi nodes are filtering the stream
of latency measurements from a remote node and turn these
into expected latency values, based on a Moving Percentile
(MP) filter, a variant on the Moving Median filter, used to
filter out heavy-tailed errors [12, 13]. This filter acts as a
low-pass filter, where anomalies are ignored while a base-
line signal passes through. This allows Vivaldi to smoothly
adapt to shifts in the baseline (that BGP route changes cause
for example). The goal of the latency filter is to summarize
the measurements, providing a current and stable descrip-
tion of the expected latency between any two nodes. Ledlie
et al. [12] found that using this simple latency filter with the
a size of the history window equal to four observations and a
percentile of 25% was a good predictor for the next observed
latency (i.e. consider the minimum value of a four-latency
measurements stream, for coordinates computation).
The PlanetLab experiments were conducted over a set of
280 PlanetLab nodes spread world-wide, running Vivaldi, as
a coordinate-embedding service. For the purpose of our ex-
perimentations, we slightly modified the logging functions
of the Vivaldi protocol. Each node is running several in-
stantiations to allow us experimenting different parameters
in similar conditions. Nodes are then updating their coordi-
nates as needed, depending on the embedding step defined
in each instantiation of the Vivaldi protocol. In the same
way, the dimension of coordinates varies from one instanti-
ation to another on the same node 1, and a node is acting as
a malicious node or as a honest ’normal’ node.
Each node had 20 neighbors (i.e. was attached to 20 springs),
10 of which being chosen to be closer than 50 ms. The
constant fraction Cc for the adaptive timestep (see [5] for
details) is set to 0.25. When needed, Surveyor nodes were
chosen that represent 8% of the overall population [8].
2.2 Observations
Figure 1 shows a typical evolution of the coordinates of a
Vivaldi node. Each sub-figure depicts the evolution of one
coordinate component along the three axis.
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Figure 1: Typical Variations of a node’s coordinate in the
Vivaldi System.
1We experimented with different Euclidean embedding spaces and
a 2-dimensional coordinate space augmented with a height vector.
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We observe that the system after roughly 250 embedding
steps, reaches a stationary regime, but coordinates continue
to fluctuate. Looking further in the entire set of nodes’ co-
ordinates, we observe that coordinates steadily variate, mov-
ing away from the origin (03) of the coordinate system. The
rate of these variations is low enough to allow distance es-
timation at the application level, but this prevents us from
certifying absolute coordinates.
More specifically, because at any instant in time, the RTT
that can be measured between two nodes depends on the
state of the network (e.g. traffic load, state of queues in
routers, etc), the exact value of the RTT varies continuously.
However, it has been shown that RTT values in the Internet
exhibit some stability in a statistical sense [14], with the sta-
tistical properties of RTTs exhibiting no significant change
at timescales of several minutes. It is that property that em-
bedding systems exploit to provide good distance estimates
while only needing to have nodes adjust (recalculate) their
coordinates on a periodic basis. Consequently, the node’s
coordinate can be viewed as a discrete stochastic process,
embedded at the instants of updates.
Regardless of the dimensionality used by the coordinate-
systems, our main goal is to assign to any coordinate given
by a node, a reliability value that is telling the likelihood that
this coordinate is still valid and has not changed. For this
purpose we observe for our set of 450 planetlab nodes the
inter-shift time distribution, corresponding to the amount of
time (in terms of embedding steps intervals) during which,
nodes stick to their positions, i.e. the coordinates do not
change. This distribution is denoted Ti for each node i. It
is important to note that although we observed that in our
traces, a variation of one coordinate component was syn-
onym to the variation of both others, we consider the inter-
shift time as the laps of time corresponding to the non varia-
tion of all the coordinate components of this node.
Basically, we would like to determine which probability
distribution is suitable to describe the inter-shift times. In the
following, we will use our empirical data sets of inter-shift
times to find the probability distribution that best describes
the distribution values of each Ti.
2.3 Inter-shift Time Distribution Fitting
For choosing the best suitable distribution, we use a set of
candidate distributions containing lognormal, Weibull, Rayleigh
and Gamma distributions 2.
For each one of the 450 nodes in the dataset, we apply
a two-step procedure. In the first step, we derive the maxi-
mum likelihood estimates of parameters of each distribution
in the candidate set. The likelihood is the probability to get
the observed inter-shift times for some hypothetic distribu-
tion. The estimates of the distribution parameters are then
the values that maximize their likelihood.
In a second step, we used goodness of fit tests to evalu-
2The Gaussian distribution was not tested because the empirical
distribution was not symmetrical around a mean.
ate if the hypothesis that the observed values Ti come from
the candidate distribution can be rejected or not. The good-
ness of fit evaluation was done using the popular and robust
Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test [15], applied at a signifi-
cance level of 5%.
We show in figure 2, the results of the fitting done on one
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Figure 2: Density plots and CDF of a typical inter-shift
distribution (Node 181).
of the datasets relative to node 181. Simple inspection by
eye shows that the lognormal distribution produces the best
fits among the set of distributions. This is validated by the
K-S test that rejects all the candidate distributions but the
lognormal.
Using the fitting procedure described above, we tried to fit
the inter-shift datasets. The first interesting result we found
is that all of the empirical distributions examined can be fit-
ted to a known distribution. A large majority of distributions
can be fitted into a lognormal distribution. The lognormal
hypothesis was rejected for only 5 datasets out of the 450.
Looking further in these 5 inter-shift datasets, we observed
that they have a good fit with the Weibull distribution. Ta-
ble 1 gives a summary of our findings for the Kolmogorov
Smirnov goodness of fit tests.
2.4 Correlation between Surveyors and Nodes
inter-shift Distributions
Having shown that inter-shift time distribution of our pop-
ulation of nodes in the Vivaldi system is compatible with ei-
ther a lognormal distribution in most cases or a Weibull dis-
tribution otherwise whose parameters can be obtained by a
maximum likelihood method, the next question is how well
the shifts as observed by Surveyor nodes can be used as rep-
resentative of the shifts of regular nodes. Basically, if the
inter-shift distribution of a node as seen by the surveyors is
the same as the real inter-shift distribution, the former may
be used as a reference to validate the node’s coordinate.
The verification of this hypothesis is done by comparing
the sequence of inter-shift as seen by surveyors and the real
inter-shift of a node and asking if the hypothesis that these
two sequences come from the same distribution can be re-
jected or not. The latter test is done using a two-sample
Kolmogorov Smirnov Test (with a significance level of 5%)
that precisely gives an answer to the previous question. For
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Table 1: Results using the Kologorov Smirnov Test for fitting the inter-shift Times data.
Fitted Distributions % of samples that passed the test
log-Normal 445/450
Rayleigh 2/450
Weibull 5/450
Gamma 6/450
each of the 35 surveyor nodes, we applied therefore 415 two-
sample K-S test.
To answer this question, we analyzed for each surveyor
nodes the likelihood that the two-samples KS-test is rejected
as a function of the distance (measured as an RTT) between
the surveyor node and the tested regular node. The likeli-
hood is obtained as the ratio between the number of nodes
with a given RTT that reject the test and the overall num-
ber of regular nodes. Figure 3 shows this rejection ratio vs.
the distance (measured as an RTT) between a node and the
corresponding Surveyor, as observed during the PlanetLab
experiment.
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Figure 3: Correlation between ’Nodes-Surveyors’ RTTs
and the rejection Ratio.
Intuitively, a Surveyor should have tendency to have the
same inter-shift distribution as nodes that are close by in
terms of RTT, as they are more likely to experience simi-
lar dynamics of the coordinate system. Figure 3 validates
this intuition and shows that better locality between a node
and its Surveyor yields more accurate fittings.
We therefore apply the following heuristics: the inter-shift
time distribution of the closest Surveyor is used as the repre-
sentative distribution for regular nodes.
3. COORDINATE CERTIFICATION
The method we propose to certify Internet coordinates
consists in two steps:
1. the node coordinate verification test;
2. computation of an estimated validity period for this co-
ordinate.
The coordinate verification test leverages the Surveyor in-
frastructure and malicious embedding neighbor detection pro-
posed in [8], while the validity period estimation is based on
the results presented in section 2.
3.1 Coordinate Verification
3.1.1 Principle
The method for malicious embedding neighbor detection
proposed in [8] is based on a model of the evolution of a
nodes’s observed relative errors, during embedding steps.
These relative errors, defined as |||Xi−Xj ||−RTTij |
RTTij
, where
Xi and Xj are the nodes’ coordinates and RTTij the mea-
sured distance between the nodes, have been shown to be
trackable by a Kalman filter in the case of a system without
malicious nodes. The idea is thus to have a set of trusted
nodes (a.k.a Surveyors), well positioned in the network and
acting as vantage points, that compute their coordinates by
embedding with each other exclusively and thus observe the
evolution of their relative errors in a clean system without
influence from malicious nodes. It was also shown that the
Kalman filters calibrated on such nodes can advantageously
track the relative error model at nearby untrusted nodes. Each
Kalman filter is capable of providing a predicted relative er-
ror (based on the history of observed measured errors) as
well as the distribution of its innovation process which is
the deviation between the measured and predicted relative
errors expected at each embedding step. The basis for the
malicious embedding neighbor detection test is then a sim-
ple hypothesis test on this innovation process (see [8] for
details).
It is important to note that this malicious embedding neigh-
bor detection test is based on relative errors, and thus simply
tests the consistency between the estimated and measured
distances between two nodes. In particular, this test is not
able to evaluate the truthfulness of a node’s coordinate. In-
deed, if during an embedding step a node fakes its coordi-
nate but at the same time delays the measurement probes in a
way consistent with its faked position in the coordinate space
(based on the knowledge of the correspondent’s coordinate,
as well as its own true and fake coordinates), then the result-
ing relative error measured between the two nodes is reduced
(see figure 4). Indeed, if a node at coordinate Xi fakes a co-
ordinate X ′i , then its real distance to another node (e.g. a
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Surveyor) at coordinate Xj is RTTi,j (this RTT is the time
the probe actually travels between the 2 nodes). To be con-
sistent with its faked position, the faking node should delay
the measurement probe by ||X ′i−Xj ||− ||Xi−Xj ||, so that
the measured RTT,RTT ′i,j = RTTi,j+||X ′i−Xj ||−||Xi−
Xj ||. The relative error that should have been measured is
clearly |||Xi−Xj ||−RTTi,j |
RTTi,j
, while the relative error measured
due to the faked position is |||X
′
i−Xj ||−RTT
′
i,j |
RTT ′
i,j
. Simple sub-
stitution allows the measured relative error to be rewritten as
|||Xi−Xj ||−RTTi,j |
RTT ′
i,j
, which is clearly lower than the relative
error that would be measured if the node did not fake its co-
ordinate (sinceRTT ′i,j > RTTi,j). Therefore, a node faking
a position further away from the testing node will never fail
a test that it wouldn’t have failed in the first place if it wasn’t
faking.
Figure 4: Fake Coordinate and Consistent Relative Er-
ror
Consequently, to verify a node’s coordinate, several such
tests must be performed from vantage points (Surveyors)
surrounding the node (see figure 6). In this case, a node
could easily fake its coordinate and consistently delay probes
so that it moved away from some Surveyors without being
noticed. But such fake position would necessarily also result
in the node moving closer to some other Surveyors and fail-
ing the corresponding malicious embedding neighbor tests
as it is next to impossible to “speed up” a distance probe
protected by the simplest of mechanisms (e.g. hashing, sim-
ple encryption, random probe numbers, etc). A node must
be surrounded by at least one more Surveyors than there are
dimensions in the space.
If the malicious embedding neighbor test is negative at
each Surveyor chosen to surround the node (i.e. the relative
error observed between the Surveyor and the node is con-
sidered normal), then the coordinate claimed by the node is
considered correct. Note that this test is different from a nor-
mal “triangulation” approach, where the measured distances
between the node and the Surveyors would be used along-
side the Surveyors’ coordinates to determine the node’s own
coordinate. Indeed, our test is in fact made up of multiple,
independent tests on the plausibility of the observed relative
errors and provides our method with an important resistance
to the triangular inequality violations (TIVs) [16, 17] that
can be commonly encountered in the Internet. This is be-
cause the Kalman filters underlying the tests are calibrated
during normal embedding of the Surveyors, and thus in con-
ditions where TIVs are naturally encountered, so the system
noise resulting from these TIVs is therefore implicitly taken
into account in the relative error tracking. We do not claim
that our test is immune to the problems caused by TIVs (and
these TIVs will be responsible for some of the false positives
of our test), but it is nevertheless much less sensitive to them
than a geometric approach like triangulation would be.
If a node cannot be surrounded by Surveyors (i.e. there is
at least one axis along which the corresponding coordinate
component of the node is either greater or smaller than the
corresponding coordinate component of all Surveyors), then
the node’s coordinate cannot be verified. This is because the
node could easily fake its position by moving away from the
Surveyors along this axis, without being detected, by using
the technique described in figure 4 with each Surveyor. It
is therefore important to have Surveyors placed near the co-
ordinate space boundaries, as well as inside the space (oth-
erwise part of the nodes population may never be able to
get coordinate certificates). More precisely, the convex hull3
of all nodes (including the Surveyors) should be composed
of Surveyors only. Or seen differently, any node lying out-
side the convex hull of the set of Surveyors can never be
surrounded and thus can never be issued a coordinate certifi-
cate. For this paper, and to reflect a plausible deployment
scenario, some of the Surveyors were deliberately placed
near the space boundaries, so that the Surveyors’ convex hull
encloses most, but not all, nodes, while the other Surveyors
were chosen at random (see Figure 5).
Figure 5: Distribution of regular and Surveyor nodes in
a 2d space (distances are in ms).
3.1.2 Protocol
3The convex hull of a set of points is the smallest convex set con-
taining all the points. Think of it as being the smallest “enclosure”
that can be formed with some of the points and that has no points
outside it [18].
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Figure 6: Surveyors surrounding a node for coordinates
verification
A node who wish to have its coordinate certified contacts
the known closest Surveyor to its claimed coordinate. If this
Surveyor is not the closest, the node is redirected to the clos-
est one known by the Surveyor. For this, as well as the se-
lection of Surveyors surrounding the coordinate claimed by
a node to happen, Surveyors exchange their coordinates us-
ing a gossiping protocol.
Based on its knowledge of the position of other Survey-
ors, as well as on the coordinate of the node to be certified,
the certifying Surveyor selects a set of Surveyors (a.k.a sur-
rounding Surveyors) that surround the node’s claimed po-
sition (possibly including itself) and informs these of the
node’s claimed coordinate so to ensure they all use the same
node’s coordinate for their distance estimates during their
malicious embedding neighbor detection test.
Recall that Surveyors compute their own coordinate by
using each other exclusively as embedding neighbors [8].
This gives the Surveyors the view of a clean system without
malicious insider attacks. Therefore, if Surveyors run their
own malicious embedding neighbor detection test at each
embedding step, all such tests should ideally be negative as
Surveyors only have trusted and honest neighbors (other Sur-
veyors). Unfortunately, no test is perfect and some amount
of the tests carried out by each Surveyor will wrongly iden-
tify the neighbor as malicious. Such occurrence is a false
positive and the Surveyor will take no action about the said
neighbor (or more precisely the particular embedding step
with this neighbor). However, carrying out such tests at ev-
ery embedding step provides the Surveyors with estimates
of two important test statistics: the false positive test ratio
(FPTR – i.e. the percentage of the tests that were positive
and wrongly identified a fellow Surveyor as malicious) and
the true negative test ratio (TNTR – i.e. the percentage of
the tests that were negative and thus correctly identified the
fellow Surveyors as honest nodes).
Let Yi be the indicator random variable that represents the
outcome of a malicious embedding neighbor detection test
at the ith Surveyor (testing another Surveyor), with:
Yi =
{
0 if the neighbor identified as honest
1 if the neighbor identified as malicious
Taking as null hypothesis H0 that the tested node is honest
(which is always the case when Surveyors are tested), the
true negative test ratio (TNTR) estimate pi at the ith Sur-
veyor is Prob
{
Yi = 0|H0
}
, the number of tests that were
correct divided by the overall number of tests carried out.
The FPTR is then obviously 1− pi.
After performing the requested malicious embedding neigh-
bor detection test on the node whose coordinate is to be cer-
tified, the surrounding Surveyors return the result of their
test, along with their estimated TNTR, to the certifying Sur-
veyor. If every test returned is negative (i.e. each surround-
ing Surveyor considered the node as honest), then the node’s
coordinate is deemed correct and verified and the certifying
Surveyor proceeds to the second step of the certification de-
scribed in section 3.2.
On the other hand, if at least one of the surrounding Sur-
veyor returns a positive test, that is, did consider the node
as potentially malicious because of too much of a devia-
tion between the measured relative error and the expected
one, the certifying Surveyor must decide whether to declare
the node’s coordinate as suspicious and thus refuse to issue
a certificate, or whether further test should be carried out.
To do so, the probability that the node, and its claimed co-
ordinate, have been identified mistakenly as suspicious by
the surrounding Surveyors is computed. This probability
is simply 1 −
∏
i∈ξj pi, where ξj is the set of surround-
ing Surveyors chosen to verify the claimed coordinates of
the node at this round of testing. If the overall probabil-
ity that the node has been mistakenly classified as suspi-
cious is greater than a given significance value γ, that is if∏
1≤j≤N (1 −
∏
i∈ξj pi) > γ, where N is the number of
test rounds that have been carried out so far, then the cer-
tifying Surveyor starts another test round with a new set of
surrounding Surveyors. Note that the sets of selected sur-
rounding Surveyors at each round are not necessarily dis-
joint, although such property is desirable.
In this paper, we used γ = 1% and limited N to 6 (i.e.
a node is refused a coordinate certificate if the probability
of mistaken refusal falls below 1% and/or the node fails 6
consecutive test rounds).
3.1.3 Evaluation
In this section, we seek to evaluate the effectiveness of our
proposed coordinate verification method.
We first seek to validate the assumption that the FPTR val-
ues measured during embedding at Surveyors provide good
estimates for the real FPTR values at these Surveyors. To
do so, we let a vivaldi system, without cheat, converge and
6
run on PlanetLab for over 2500 time ticks (i.e. embedding
periods). the Surveyors measured their estimated FPTR by
carrying out a malicious embedding neighbour detection test
at every embedding step. At the end of the experiment,
each Surveyor also measured its real FPTR by running a
malicious embedding neighbour detection test to every other
nodes in the system. Since this system does not have any
malicious node in it, a failed test is a false positive. The
CDF of the differences of these 2 values at each Surveyor is
shown in figure 7. We see that the difference between the es-
timated and the real FPTR are mostly within less than 1% of
each other, confirming that our proposed estimation method
yields reliable FPTR estimates. Even in the cases where the
FPTR estimates differ more than the real value, these will
only affect the coordinate verification tests in which the cor-
responding Surveyors take place: in these cases the coordi-
nate verification test will be slightly more aggressive than it
ought to (since the FPTR estimate is smaller than the real
value), favouring security.
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Figure 7: CDF of False positive probability differences.
Next, we seek to further understand the behaviour of false
positive and true negative occurrences. Figure 8(a) is a scat-
ter plot of the distance between a node and its Surveyor,
whenever the malicious embedding neighbour detection test
through a false positive at the Surveyor. This figure clearly
indicates that Surveyors hardly ever experience wrong test
results when testing nearby honest nodes. Complementarily,
Figure 8(b) shows that Surveyors are much more success-
ful at identifying nearby honest nodes correctly. These re-
sults indicate that striving to choose surrounding Surveyors
as close as possible to the node whose coordinate are being
verified will increase the effectiveness of the coordinate ver-
ification test (by reducing the occurrences of false positive
in the multiple test, through reduction of false positive oc-
currences in the component tests making this multiple test
up). This is therefore the strategy adopted in the rest of this
paper.
To assess the overall effectiveness of the proposed coordi-
nate verification method, we then make all nodes try to move
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Figure 8: Correlation between distance and test perfor-
mance.
away in all direction, from their position in the converged
system. In this experiment, each node varies the direction of
its move one degree at a time. Along each direction, it tries
to move a distance drawn at random form the distribution of
the innovation process computed by the Kalman filter cali-
brated at the nearest Surveyor [8], in a bid to outsmart the
malicious embedding neighbour detection test. After each
move, the node requests a re-certification of its coordinate.
The displacement achieved by the node until the correspond-
ing fake coordinate is declared incorrect by our verification
method is then recorded. Figure 9 shows, the average, mini-
mum and maximum displacement observed across all nodes,
as a function of the direction of movement. Note that this fig-
ure only take into account the nodes that are eligible for cer-
tification (i.e. the nodes that lie inside the Surveyors convex
hull, see section 3.1.1), meaning that 13 nodes are excluded
from the experiment.
Figure 9: Undetected displacement as a function of di-
rection.
We see that the maximum displacement achieved by any
node is below 10 ms, while the average is around 6 ms.
Such deviations are of the order of the distance prediction
accuracy (they will not decrease the accuracy of the coordi-
nate system in any significant way) and will be acceptable to
many applications.
Finally, we experimented with a simple attack, carried out
by a growing malicious node population that has access to
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the coordinates of all nodes in the system. The malicious
nodes compute the centroid of the overall node population,
and then try to move in a random direction away from this
centroid (adding 2 seconds) in order to be isolated. Figure 10
shows the detection rate, that is the percentage of certificate
requests for faked coordinates that was denied, as a function
of the malicious population size, for various dimensions of
the coordinate space. Note that although these curves show a
slightly decreasing trend, a smaller percentage of an increas-
ing number of requests for faked coordinates does mean, in
most cases, an increasing number of denials. With over 95%
detection rates in most cases, the coordinate verification test
can be considered as highly efficient.
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Figure 10: Self isolation: Detection probability.
However, tests may achieve high detection rates by be-
ing overly aggressive towards honest nodes that to not cheat.
The false positive rate, that is the percentage of certificate
requests for real coordinates that were wrongly denied, is a
measure of this aggressivity towards non malicious nodes
and should be kept as low as possible. Figure 11 shows
the measured false positive rate, as a function of the size
of the malicious population, for various dimensionality of
the coordinate space. Note that these curves depend on the
performance of the test only, and not on the activities of
the malicious nodes. Also, note that as the population of
malicious nodes increases, the corresponding population of
honest nodes decreases, so an upward trend actually cor-
responds to fewer wrongly denied certification requests to
honest nodes. With a false positive rate lower than 6% in all
cases, our test can be considered as moderately, and accept-
ably, aggressive.
In light of the evaluation results presented in this section,
we conclude that our proposed test for coordinate verifica-
tion exhibits good performance and is fit for purpose.
3.2 Certificate Validity Computation
After the correctness of a node’s advertised coordinates
has been asserted, the next step is to issue the node with
a certificate proving that the enclosed coordinate has been
verified. This certificate will be delivered by the certifying
Surveyor (i.e. usually the Surveyor closest to the node in the
coordinate space, see sections 2.4 and 3.1.2).
As a coordinate certificate is associated with a particular
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Figure 11: Self Isolation: False Positive Ratio.
position in the coordinate space that the node occupies or has
occupied, one could expect that nodes request new certifi-
cate on moving to a new position. While this is certainly the
behaviour anticipated from honest nodes that are interested
in being able to prove their true position, malicious nodes
might decide not to do so. Indeed, a malicious node is prob-
ably much more interested in faking its true position, and
doing so with a certificate “proving” a position which isn’t
really its own, whatever this coordinate might be, is probably
a bonus for such a node. While the coordinate verification
protocol described in section 3.1.2 has been designed to pre-
vent, as much as possible, malicious nodes from acquiring
certificates for fake coordinates that they may choose, the
problem of nodes using certificates for positions that have
meanwhile changed, is still to be addressed.
The obvious way to solve this “stale” certificate problem,
is to assign a reliability to the certificate. The reliability of
the certificate decreases with time from its issuance time.
When it crosses a certain threshold pth the certificate should
be invalidated and eventually reissued. There is a trade-
off between certificate precision (and therefore security) and
frequency of coordinate certification that is controlled by the
reliability pth. Using larger value of pth, leads to higher re-
liability for certificates but at the cost of frequently reissu-
ing certificates that are still valid. On the other hand lower
pth results in lower reliability, but also reduces the load on
Surveyors who would receive certificate requests less fre-
quently. The issue here is really to find the right trade-off
between scalability (by limiting the rate or amount of certifi-
cate requests) and security (by limiting the time lapse during
which a malicious node may be able to use an old certificate
after its coordinate has changed). We will therefore seek to
exploit the results on coordinate inter-shift times presented
in section 2.3 to compute certificate validity periods.
Note that this section assumes that all nodes in the system
are “loosely” time synchronized: since coordinate inter-shift
times have been shown to take values that are usually mea-
sured in minutes (see section 2), as long as all clocks are syn-
chronized with an accuracy exhibiting a smaller timescale
(say a few seconds), the notion of time in the system can
then be considered unique. This time synchronization can
easily be obtained through using NTP (at least about survey-
8
ors).
3.2.1 Principle
The problem of computing a validity period for coordi-
nate certificates can be formalized through reliability theory.
Let’s define the survival function of the coordinate of node
i as the probability, SiT0(∆) = Prob
{
T i > T i0 + ∆
}
, that
the next change of coordinate occurs later than ∆ time units
after the last coordinate change, happening at time T i0. The
survival function is thus related to the inter-shift time cumu-
lative distribution F i(∆) = Prob
{
T i ≤ T i0 + ∆
}
through
Si(∆) = 1− F i(∆).
Recall from section 2.4, that the inter-shift times observed
at a Surveyors are similar to those observed at nearby nodes.
Hence, the inter-shift time distribution at a certifying Sur-
veyor is the distribution used to compute the validity of the
certificates it issues (since it issues certificates to the nodes
that are closest to it than to any other Surveyors).
The survival function can be used to compute the validity
of a certificate, that is the time remaining until the next coor-
dinate change. The probability that the next position change
occurs at or before time τ + ∆, given that the certificate is
being issued at time τ is just:
Prob
{
T < τ + ∆|T > τ
}
=
Prob
{
τ < T < τ + ∆
}
Prob
{
T > τ
}
= 1−
Si(τ + ∆− T i0)
Si(τ − T i0)
In fact, we use the above probability, computed at a Sur-
veyor whose survival function and last coordinate change
time are Si(∆) and T i0 respectively, to estimate the lapse
of time until the next position change of the node request-
ing the certificate. In other words, the assumption here is
that network conditions for nodes that are close to each other
should change in a synchronous way. However, due to the
asynchronous nature of embedding steps at different nodes,
their respective coordinates will not all change at the same
time, but we take as “reference” time, the moment when the
Surveyor is expected to see a change in its coordinate.
In section 2.3, we showed that most nodes follow a log-
normal or Weibull distribution. Depending on which distri-
bution each surveyor node is observing (computing the like-
lihood at each embedding step), the above formula have a
simple form for these two distributions.
For lognormal Inter-Shift distribution we will have:
S(∆) = 1− Φ(
ln ∆
σ
)
Prob
{
T < τ + ∆|T > τ
}
= 1−
1− Φ( ln(τ+∆−T
i
0
)
σ
)
1− Φ(
ln(τ−T i
0
)
σ
)
where the function Φ(.) is the complementary error function
and σ is its shape parameter of the lognormal distribution.
For Weibull distributions we will have:
S(∆) = 1− exp(∆γ)
Prob
{
T < τ + ∆|T > τ
}
= 1−
1− exp((τ + ∆− T i0)
γ)
1− exp((τ − T i0)
γ)
where γ is the shape parameter of the Weibull distribution.
The validity time of a certificate, ∆, is then computed by
setting Prob
{
T < τ + ∆|T > τ
}
= pth, where pth is
the chosen reliability of the estimate (i.e. the long-term pro-
portions of validity periods that will expire before the corre-
sponding coordinate change).
The certificate then consists in the verified coordinate, the
timestamp of the certificate creation, the validity period ∆
of the certificate, as well as the identification of the node the
certificate is delivered to (i.e. IP address). The certificate is
then signed by the the certifying Surveyor using appropriate
credentials and encryption keys and issued to the node.
3.2.2 Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of our certificate validity com-
putation, we study the over-estimation resulting from each
certificate: for each certificate issued, if the corresponding
node moves before its current certificate expires, we record
the residual time left on the certificate. This over-estimation
is an important security parameter, as it is the lapse of time
a malicious node could use a “stale” certificate.
Figure 12 shows the CDF of over-estimation times when
the certificates are issued by either the closest Surveyor or
a Surveyor chosen at random. We can clearly see that most
certificates will not outlive their corresponding coordinates
by more than 2 embedding periods in the case where they
bare delivered by the closest Surveyor. This is a good result,
as many a time, coordinate changes in such timescale will
be “localized” in space. The figure also confirms that the
accuracy of the validity periods, as thus the security of the
system, is improved if coordinates are certified by nearby
Surveyors.
Scalability is also an important factor for any certification
scheme. Although under-estimation of the validity period of
certificates does not pose any security issue for the system,
it does tend to increase the load on the system, and on the
Surveyors in particular. Obviously, the higher the probabil-
ity threshold used to compute the certificate validity time,
the shorter this time will be. We therefore measure the mean
validity period over all certificates for various values of the
probability threshold. Figure 13 shows the corresponding
average certification rate, which is the inverse of the mean
validity period. The average certification rate gives the av-
erage number of certification requests that will be issued per
node and per time unit (here the embedding period) to the
system. This number, multiplied by the number of nodes in
the system, and divided by the number of Surveyors and the
embedding period gives a certificate request rate per second
at each Surveyor.
Figure 13 shows that the average certification rate increases
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gently as the probability threshold increases (i.e. as the com-
putation becomes more conservative). This behaviour shows
that we can afford a reliability of 95% (and therefore high
security) with moderately low overhead.
Figure 12: CDF of Over Estimation Times (pth = 0.95),
Embedding period = 10mn
Figure 13: Average Certification Rate
4. DISTANCE ESTIMATION PERFORMANCE
EVALUATION
In this section, we study the impact of an attack on the
accuracy of distance estimations, with and without our pro-
posed coordinate certification defense mechanism.
The attack consists in malicious nodes choosing, once the
Vivaldi system has stabilized, a target they wish to get closer
to (each malicious node chooses a target at random amongst
the honest nodes), and moving in a straight line towards this
target by steps computed from the innovation process of their
Kalman filter (see section 3.1.3 and [8] for details). Af-
ter each displacement, the malicious node seeks to have its
newly faked coordinate certified. This strategy is designed
to outsmart the tests used for coordinate verification, by only
taking (fake) steps that could be attributed to normal system
dynamics, as well as caused by normal noise, by the detec-
tion test [8]. We choose such subtle attack, as more obvious
displacement caused by fake coordinate would be easier to
detect.
Obviously, in the case where coordinate certification is
employed, malicious nodes are limited to fake coordinates
they can get a certificate for.
We carry out this attack on our PlanetLab experimental
setup, with a varying population of malicious nodes.
To assess the impact on distance estimation, we define the
following metrics:
• Relative Estimation ErrorRER = |||C
′
i−Cj ||−||Ci−Cj |||
||Ci−Cj ||
,
whereCi is a node’s real coordinate in the system with-
out malicious activity, and C ′i is a node’s advertised
coordinate (and C ′i is either faked, certified or both).
• Security Gain Ratio SGR = meanRERon/meanRERoff ,
where meanRERon (meanRERoff resp.) is the av-
erage RER measured between all pairs of node when
the security mechanism is on (off resp.).
Figure 14 shows the SGR observed at the end of the ex-
periment that was allowed to run for a considerable time af-
ter convergence of the original (clean) Vivaldi system. The
curve labeled “ratio1” depicts the SGR measured in the pres-
ence of malicious nodes, while the curve labeled “ratio2” de-
picts the SGR measured in the clean Vivaldi system without
malicious activity.
From this figure, we can conclude that the accuracy of dis-
tance estimation in the system with malicious nodes is much
improved when coordinate certification is in use than when
it is not. This is because the coordinate verification phase of
the certification filters out most of the faked displacements.
We also see that the curve “ratio2” exhibits a value of 1, in-
dicating that the presence of the certification system does not
degrade the performance of the clean system without mali-
cious nodes (in other words, the coordinate certification is
very much non intrusive).
Figure 14: Progressive Displacement Attack: Security
gain ratio varying the malicious nodes percentage in the
overall population.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we have presented a coordinate certification
method to protect the distance estimation phase of Internet
Coordinate Systems from nodes lying about their coordinate.
This work thus complements our previous work on Coordi-
nate System embedding phase security [8].
The proposed certification method is based on a coordi-
nate verification method, along with a validity period esti-
mation for the corresponding certificate. This method has
been shown to be effective, enjoying good verification test
performance (high true positive detection rate with low false
positive rates), while achieving a very good trade-off be-
tween scalability and security. Indeed, the validity periods
of certificates are rarely over-estimated, while they still do
not trigger too frequent re-certifications.
The reader should note though, that a node knows when its
next embedding will occur, and thus when its coordinate is
likely to change. A malicious node could exploit this knowl-
edge to seek to obtain a certificate (for its current coordi-
nate) just before performing this embedding, as this could
leave such node in possession of a certificate for a soon to
be outdated coordinate. To palliate this problem, one could
envisage that Surveyors carry out “spot check” on the valid-
ity of a node’s certificate: if the certified coordinate fails a
new coordinate verification test, the node is “penalized” for
using an outdated certificate.
Although this paper focused on Vivaldi for measurements
and experimentations, the method proposed for coordinate
certification is independent of the embedding protocol used.
This because the malicious embedding neighbour detection
test that forms the basis of the coordinate verification is it-
self independent of the specifics of the embedding protocol,
and because the validity period computation only depends on
observed coordinate inter-shift times. Our proposed method
would then be general enough to be applied in the context of
coordinates computed by other Internet coordinate systems
than Vivaldi.
Finally, regardless of the accuracy of Internet coordinate
systems, we believe that securing them is a necessary con-
dition to their deployment. Indeed, without security of both
the embedding and distance estimation phases, simple at-
tacks have been shown to easily and seriously disrupt these
systems and reduce their utility to next to nothing. This pa-
per thus complements previous work on embedding phase
security [8] in this important security mission.
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